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Bob Sandmeyer, lecturer at the University of Kentucky, 
specialized in the German phenomenological movement, pu-
blished his Ph.D. dissertation under the title Husserl’s pheno-
menological movement, a book that we will review in this text. 
It should be noted from the start that Sandmeyer’s first 
intention was to study Husserl’s late works, namely those that 
the German philosopher produced after his retirement in 1928, 
a study guided by the focus on the conception of the historic 
constitution. Eventually, the author turned his attention to the 
entire corpus of Husserl’s writings, including here also the 
Nachlass (literary estate), a decision made possible by the fol-
lowing discovery: the volumes in the Husserliana that are not 
among those published by Husserl himself were the outcome of 
an interpretative view or other from the part of the editors that 
concealed the direction of Husserl’s investigation. The following 
step taken by this research was to question the possibility of a 
system of phenomenological movement, a system that would 
express just this direction of Husserl’s investigation.  
With this new scope, Sandmeyer’s new research theme 
could be formulated as follows: is there a possibility to identify 
a unity in Husserl’s thought that runs through all his published 
and unpublished writings and that could clarify some of his 
more or less apparent incongruities and disparities? Or, in the 
author’s own words: “At issue in this investigation is not a spe-
cial problem of Husserl’s philosophy – such as the role of his-
toricity in his Crisis writings – but rather the very essence of 
transcendental phenomenology as Husserl conceived it” (p. 31). BOOK REVIEWS 
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This is by no means an easy task. We only need to evoke those 
more or less apparent contradictions that could be identified in 
Husserl’s phenomenology: realism vs. idealism, static consti-
tution vs. genetic constitution and so on.  
What about his unpublished manuscripts? When view-
ing them for the first time you cannot help to think that they 
are just a chaotic bundle of experimental and disjoined re-
searches. Nonetheless, studying them, Sandmeyer realized an 
important fact about Husserl’s mode of investigation, namely 
that it has a zigzag structure. This means that when studying a 
certain problem, the German philosopher used to come back 
after months or even years to the first formulation of his con-
cern, and this repeatedly. Husserl did this with the intention of 
reconfiguring the problem in the light of his latest findings. The 
zigzagged mode of approach is a method requested by the 
nature of the phenomenological problems themselves or, to put 
it differently, is endemic to Husserl’s philosophy. Take, for 
example, the distinction between the natural attitude and the 
transcendental one: “One begins with the natural attitude to 
return to it again from the quite unnatural stance of the 
phenomenological attitude in order to make clear and bring to 
expression the position-takings going on quite naturally and 
anonymously within the phenomenologically uncritical 
attitude” (p. 20). If this is the case, then Husserl’s phenome-
nological program could be reduced to a never ending reworking 
and intensification of some major themes which run from the 
Logical Investigations to the Crisis. The exegete will capitalize 
on this finding by using it as guiding line through Husserl’s 
texts: “Husserl’s very style of philosophizing should thus 
provide us a means internal to his investigations by which to 
discover within them the systematic development of analyses 
within the total problem field of transcendental phenome-
nology” (p. 20).  
So far we brought to light the range of Sandmeyer’s 
study, as well as its interpretative principle. In what follows, 
we will undertake a brief survey of the exegete’s arguments 
through a step by step presentation of the book’s four chapters. 
It should be noted that the author incorporated four appendices 
in his book, which have relevance in the argumentative devel-META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (2) / 2009 
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opment of this research. The first is a catalogue of Husserl’s 
writings published during his lifetime. The second represents a 
translation into English of the correspondence between Husserl 
and Georg Misch. The third includes the draft arrangements of 
Husserl’s Bernau time-investigations by Fink and the last one 
contains a variety of plans which represent the first steps taken 
by the German philosopher with the purpose of producing a 
systematic account of the phenomenological philosophy.    
The first chapter, called “A Question of Focus”, deals 
with two issues: first of all, it embarks on a discussion about 
the possibility of discovering a systematic explanation of 
phenomenology in the writings published by Husserl himself; 
secondly, it puts forward an overview of the corpus of texts 
which the German philosopher produced for his own use. 
Regarding the first task, the starting point of the analysis is 
paragraph 153 from Ideen I in which Husserl proposes a sketch 
of the full extension of the phenomenological problematic. Thus 
the exegete holds that the Ideen I articulates phenomenology as 
a discipline which presumes eidetic investigations and 
descriptions of the essential structures that are given in 
experience. Taking as an example the perception of a cup, 
Sandmeyer specifies the phenomenological outline of this 
experience. It is put forward here nothing less than the famous 
Husserlian analysis of the make-up of a transcendent 
perception, which, among others, includes reference to its 
adumbrative character, a feature that prescribes the act as an 
imperfect setting – there will always be a moment of the object 
that is meant only through an indeterminate expectation, 
which may or may not be fulfilled. This imperfection has a 
tremendous role in the constitution of the perceptual sense: it 
does not represent a diminishing of the experience, but rather 
the essential condition for the appearance of the physical object 
as it appears, that is as perceptual sense formed by a 
harmonious string of appearances. The adumbrative character 
of perception implies also that consciousness has a temporal 
character – the object is not given in a full blow, which suggests 
a temporal dynamic. From this scrutiny Sandmeyer concludes 
that “the central theme of phenomenology is precisely this 
dynamic on-going sense-determining consciousness” (p. 5). Even BOOK REVIEWS 
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though we have here an important feature of phenomenology, 
Ideen I was intended to represent only a first entrance into a 
problematic that required further refinement or, otherwise put, 
it was meant to provide the bridge – research theme and 
methodology, that is the phenomenological reduction – to 
upcoming concrete constitutive analyses (Ideen II) and to the 
grounding of philosophy as science by phenomenology (Ideen 
III). Having in mind that these texts never came to print, the 
exegete comes to the conclusion that in Ideen I could be found 
only a partial sketch of the complete systematic structuring of 
problems pertaining to phenomenology.  
Concerning the second task of the aforementioned 
chapter, Sandameyer undertakes an analysis of the structure of 
the  Nachlass and of the way it was published in the 
Husserliana. One of the most important aspects that the 
exegete is trying to suggest is that if one tries to understand 
Husserl’s philosophy, one must “comprehend the tangled 
contents of this Nachlass” (p. 29). But the research manuscripts 
confront the reader with a great difficulty: they seem to lack 
any form of systematic structuring. Thus it just may be the case 
that the editors of Husserliana, in the pursuit of a 
systematization of Husserl’s Einzeluntersuchungen so that the 
thought and intentions of the German philosopher could come 
to light, introduced some organizational criterions – thematic, 
historic – that covered up a research dynamic, i.e. the zigzagged 
method that was at work through their making.  
The second chapter, titled “A Unitary Impulse”, has the 
mission of showing that a unitary development can be 
identified in Husserl’s thought. In order to accomplish this, 
Sandmeyer takes into account two sets of letters, namely those 
between Husserl and Dilthey and those between Husserl and 
Misch. The second set has relevance in this study because 
Husserl states here that there is an “impulse running through 
his thinking from the time of his first meeting with Dilthey up 
to the present” (p. 51) – the letter was written in 1929. Husserl 
met Dilthey in 1905 and they exchanged letters in 1911. This 
exchange revolves around criticisms which Husserl articulates 
in his Logos essay, namely those that identify Dilthey as a 
historic relativist. But Dilthey also criticized Husserl for his so-META: Res. in Herm., Phen., and Pract. Philosophy – I (2) / 2009 
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called “Platonic turn”, which seemed to be the outcome of his 
logicist program from the Logische Untersuchungen. Thus, it 
seems that these two philosophers were situated on two 
completely separate positions, a situation that makes 
unintelligible Husserl’s statement about the importance of his 
meeting with Dilthey. Sandmeyer tries to clarify this aspect, by 
pointing to the fact that Dilthey didn’t have any contact with 
Husserl’s turn to transcendentalism, which was the outcome of 
the development of reduction around 1905. On the contrary, the 
exegete will attempt to track down Husserl’s turn to the 
supposed influence of Dilthey. However, in his published 
writings (namely in the Logos article), Husserl mentions 
Dilthey only once. The only direct evidence about this influence 
can be found in Misch’s Briefwechsel where Husserl is said to be 
“maddeningly vague about the efficacy of this impulse” (p. 61).  
The third chapter, titled “The Development of Consti-
tutive Phenomenology”, offers a plausible positive articulation 
of the impulse mentioned above. This is probably the most 
important part of the book under attention. We will give here 
only a brief account of Sandmeyer’s explanation. Thus Husserl 
forced by the arguments of the life-philosophers, Misch for 
example, acknowledges the inadequacies of his static model of 
constitution, i.e. structural constitution through the hyletic 
data apprehended by intentional moments. At this point of 
development Husserl’s attention is caught by the reduction to 
the pure self-givennesses. The problem here is indicated by the 
fact that what gives itself to consciousness is not a bare fact, 
but rather is given to consciousness in some manner, 
constituted by it, which in turn implies that the I has to attend 
to the constitutional activity. Sandmeyer shows that the 
structural model of constitution fails exactly at this point, by 
not being able to account for the agency of the I. But this does 
not imply that the static model is wrong, but rather that its 
explicative power is limited to only a certain level. For example, 
being given the intentions behind Ideen I, namely pedagogical, 
it had a precise scope which it accomplished. In the Bernau 
time investigations Husserl will try to address these problems, 
a course of thought which will end with the development of 
a new model of constitution, i.e. the genetic one. Here, BOOK REVIEWS 
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Sandmeyer’s interpretative principle comes forth. He shows 
how “the Bernau time investigations begin precisely where the 
Logische Untersuchungen leave off. Husserl, thus, zigzags back 
to the subject matter of his earliest investigations of sense-
constitution (...) He sets about in the Bernau investigations to 
recast the earlier hard won insights within the frame of the 
more profound time-investigations” (p. 110). 
In the forth chapter, titled “The System of Phenome-
nological Philosophy”, the exegete concentrates on the efforts of 
the German philosopher to bring together the two models of 
constitution, this being precisely the contour of the system of 
phenomenological philosophy. In order to do this Sandmeyer 
examines a plan from 1926 that was produced by Husserl with 
the intent of giving a general account of the phenomenological 
system and the draft plans for a book that should have been the 
full expression of the “System of Phenomenological Philosophy” 
from the early thirties, which were the outcome of the 
collaboration between Husserl and Fink. This presentation is 
particularly interesting because, among others, it circumscribes 
the impetus behind Husserl’s decision to systematize his own 
philosophy. To give just an example, the rising popularity of 
Heidegger’s philosophy had an important impact on Husserl’s 
choice “to re-introduce his philosophy to the German and larger 
international academic public” (p. 127). 
In the end of this review it should be stated that 
Sandmeyer’s study will be of particular interest to those who 
are already acquainted with phenomenology, because it is 
helpful in the process of understanding some of Husserl’s more 
puzzling turns, namely the transcendental one and the turn to 
a genetic model of constitution.  
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